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The Eighth
Circuit Sacks the National Football League
Players Association

POWELL V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE:

ETHAN LoCK*

I.

INTRODUCTION:

EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP IN

NFL

Imagine the following scenario: the United States Bar Association
("USBA") has driven the American Bar Association out of existence and
assumed sole and absolute control over entry into the legal profession.
The USBA has divided the country into specific regions and has adopted
rules regulating the competition for and the availability of legal services
in each region.
You have just graduated first in your class from Harvard Law
School. The USBA has rewarded you for your extraordinary academic
performance by assigning you to a legal aid clinic in North Dakota, a
state located in a region which suffers from a scarcity of quality legal
services for the indigent. You are offered a yearly salary of $50,000 and
must, according to USBA regulations, either accept the offer or engage
in an occupation unrelated to the practice of law during the coming
year. In the event that you choose to engage in a different occupation,
the USBA will re-assign you next year to practice law in another region
that needs and desires your services. If, on the other hand, you choose
to accept the offer, that region will, regardless of the term of your contractual arrangement, retain perpetual rights to your services as well as
the right to fire you at any time if in its sole discretion it judges your skill
to be unsatisfactory as compared to other lawyers.
If the above scenario sounds unimaginable, un-American, and unlawful, be thankful that you practice law or some other occupation rather
than "play" professional football because this scenario is in fact an occupational reality for those who make a living from professional football.'
My experience with the employment relationship in the National Football League ("NFL") is more than academic. The harshness of the
NFL's system became apparent to me between 1984 and 1986 during
my negotiations with the Chicago Bears on behalf of a player named Al
Harris.
Harris had been the ninth player selected in the first round of the
*

B.A. 1973, University of California at Berkeley; J.D. 1977, University of North

Carolina. Consultant, G.B.A. Sportsworld.
1. See 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the National Football League
Players Association and the National Football League Management Council art. XV (Dec.
I1, 1982) (hereinafter 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement]. On February 1, 1989, the
NFL unilaterally implemented the Plan B modification of art. XV. See infra notes 98-103
and accompanying text.
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1979 NFL draft and had signed a series of five one-year contracts with
the Bears. The contract for the fifth year contained an option clause
which, in effect, bound Harris to the Bears for a sixth year. The option
clause, if exercised in 1984, would pay Harris 120% of his base salary
for the 1983 NFL season, the fifth year of his contractual commitment
2
with the Bears.
By 1982 it became apparent that the contractual arrangement between Harris and the Bears was particularly advantageous to the team.
Unfortunately for Harris, the team's good fortune became his misfortune. The length of his contractual commitment eclipsed the escalation
of salaries which occurred between 1982 and 1984 as a result of both the
1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement 3 and the random bidding war for
players between the NFL and the United States Football League
("USFL"). The former was significant because the 1982 agreement
raised minimum salaries to levels that created upward pressure on all
subsequently negotiated contracts. 4 The latter was particularly significant to Harris because it took the USFL two years to figure out that
defensive players, even stars, would increase neither gate receipts nor
television ratings. By 1985 much of the bidding for players between the
two leagues had ceased as the new league realized that large contracts
for stars were for the most part financially unsound. The net result for
Harris, a player who failed to benefit from either of these inflationary
pressures, was that his salary in the final year of his contractual commitment with the Bears (1984) was grossly below the market for a six year
veteran who started every game during the 1984 season.
Harris' contractual situation in 1984 was particularly noteworthy
because of the well-publicized contract of Wilbur Marshall, a rookie linebacker selected by the Bears earlier that year in the first round of the
NFL amateur draft. Unlike Harris, Marshall did benefit from the USFL's
existence. A phantom offer from the USFL Tampa Bay Bandits 5 triggered an immediate reaction from the Bears who, fearful of losing Marshall, signed him within days after the 1984 draft to a series of four oneyear contracts with a reported gross value of approximately $2.8 million.
Marshall and Harris played the same position, and during the 1984 season, Marshall's first and Harris' sixth in the NFL, Marshall sat on the
bench while Harris played virtually every defensive play and enjoyed the
best year of his career.
2. Harris was represented by his father and another individual in the negotiations
with the Bears for this series of contracts.
3. See 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 1, art. XXII. This article
raised minimum salaries significantly above the levels established in the 1977 agreement
between the parties. 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the National Football League Players Association and the National Football League Management Council
art. XXII (Mar. 1, 1977).
4. The average salary in the NFL in 1982 was approximately $90,000. By 1985 the
average salary had reached almost $200,000. This information is available at the National
Football League Players Association.
5. Telephone interview with Bruce Allen, General Manager 6f the USFL Arizona
Wranglers at the time Marshall was drafted. (Dec. 15, 1989).
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Although Harris' contractual commitment with the Bears ended on
February 1, 1985, he was not free to decide where and for how much he
would play in 1985. Instead, Harris' future in the NFL was controlled by
the right of first refusal/compensation system contained in article XV of
the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement. 6 Under that system, Harris
was permitted to accept offers from other teams between February 1,
and April 15, 1985. The Bears, however, had the opportunity either to
match the offer and retain Harris or to receive draft choice compensation from the other team. The compensation, which was based on the
new team's offer and the number of years Harris had been in the NFL,
raised the price of obtaining Harris' services to a level that completely
deterred new teams from making offers to Harris. In fact, this result was
predictable. Between 1977, the year that the NFL's right of first refusal/
compensation system was first implemented, and 1984, the final year of
Harris' contractual commitment with the Bears, only one player changed
teams under article XV of the 1977 and 1982 Collective Bargaining
Agreements. 7 Not surprisingly, Harris received no offers and his right
to talk to other teams ended on April 15, 1985.
Subsequent negotiations between Harris and the Bears were unproductive. The Bears rejected Harris' demands, literally offering him a
small fraction of Marshall's contract. In June 1985, the Bears granted
Harris written permission to speak to other teams concerning the possibility of working out a trade with the Bears. Several teams expressed
interest in Harris, but no trade materialized; and, in August 1985, the
Bears revoked their permission for Harris to speak with other teams.
As the 1985 season approached, Harris was faced with a choice: he
could either relinquish his demands and accept the Bears' offer or he
could forego playing football in 1985. He rejected the Bears' offer; and,
unable to negotiate a contract with any other NFL team without the
Bears' permission, he was unemployed while the Bears compiled a 15-1
record en route to Super Bowl XX. Moreover, the Bears not only won
the Super Bowl without Harris, but Marshall, Harris' replacement, was
commended by the Bears' management for his stellar performance during the 1985 season.
Unfortunately for Harris, his willingness to sacrifice a year's employment and income had no impact on his ability to seek employment
with other NFL teams. The Bears' rights to Harris under the NFL's
right of first refusal/compensation system were perpetual. In other
words, Harris was subject to the same system in 1986 that restricted his
freedom in 1985. After sitting out an entire year, he was in no better
position to seek employment with another team that might value his
services more highly than the Bears. In fact, his bargaining position appeared to be even more tenuous in 1986. He was now faced with the
6. 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 1.
7. See Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE L. J. 339,
n. 57. (citing Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777, 780 (D. Minn. 1988), rev'd, 888 F.2d 559
(8th Cir. 1989)).

[Vol. 67:2

DENVER UNIVERSITY IL W REVIEW

decision either to sit out another season, an alternative that almost certainly would have ended his career, or accept an offer from the Bears, a
team that won the Super Bowl without him and who now valued his services as a back-up rather than as a starter. He would now feel both edges
of the NFL's restrictions on free agency. He not only was unable to have
his salary determined in a competitive market, but he also was unable to
seek employment with a team for which he could play on a regular basis.
Harris' situation was unique only because he chose an alternative
that few players choose - he sat out an entire season. Every year, hundreds of players whose contractual commitments with their teams have
expired are subjected to the NFL's right of first refusal/compensation
system. 8 Virtually all players, recognizing that sitting out will diminish a
significant portion of their career earnings without increasing their bargaining leverage or ability to negotiate with other teams, ultimately accept their team's offer.
II.

CURRENT DIsPUTE BETWEEN

NFLPA

AND

NFL.

The collective bargaining agreement containing the right of first refusal/compensation system that restricted Harris' ability to negotiate
and contract with teams other than the Bears expired on August 31,
1987. 9 Negotiations between the National Football League Players Association ("NFLPA") and the National Football League Management
Council ("NFLMC") for a new agreement were unproductive; and, in
October 1987, the NFLPA filed an antitrust action challenging the continued imposition by the NFL of its restrictions on veteran free agents. 10
In response to motions by both parties, a federal district court in Minnesota held that the non-statutory labor exemption immunized the restrictions in the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement from antitrust attack
until these restrictions became an issue over which the parties bargained
to impasse. I I A subsequent ruling by the Minnesota federal district
court that the parties had in fact reached impasse exposed the NFL's
right of first refusal/compensation system to antitrust scrutiny. 12 The
Eighth Circuit, however, granted the NFLMC's petition for interlocutory
appeal of the district court's ruling regarding the expiration of the labor
exemption. 13 On November 1, 1989, the Eighth Circuit reversed the
district court, ruling that the non-statutory labor exemption extended
beyond impasse and that the antitrust laws were inapplicable to the circumstances of the NFLPA-NFL dispute. 14 On January 17, 1990, the
Eighth Circuit issued an order denying the NFLPA's petition for rehear8. Id. at n. 44 (citing Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 779-81).
9. 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 1, art. XXXVIII § 2.
10. Powell, 678 F. Supp. 777.
It. Id. at 788-89.
12. Powell v. NFL, 690 F. Supp. 812, 814 (D. Minn. 1988).
13. Petition for Permission to Appeal and Memorandum in Support of Petition, Powell v. NFL, No. 89-5091, (8th Cir., granted Feb. 24, 1989).
14. Powell v. NFL, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-1421
(Mar. 12, 1990).
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ing and suggestion for rehearing en banc. 1 5
The Eighth Circuit's decision, which I have been asked to critique,
does not address the merits of the players' claim that the NFL's right of
first refusal/compensation system described above and the modified
version of that system unilaterally implemented by the NFL on February
1, 1989, violate federal antitrust laws. The court considered only the
threshold issue of the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption. More
specifically, the court addressed only the question of whether and to
what extent the non-statutory labor exemption, an exemption that immunizes terms in a collective bargaining agreement from antitrust at16
tack, survives the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement.
III.

BACKGROUND

The purpose of federal antitrust law is to promote competition. 17
To this end, the Sherman Act,' 8 enacted in 1890, was designed to regulate commercial activity. 19 In the years immediately following the enactment of the Sherman Act, however, courts interpreted the Act's general
language to apply not only to commercial activity, but also to combinations among employees, or unions, as well as to various types of concerted union activity that interrupted the free flow of commercial
20
activity.
Application of the Sherman Act to labor combinations impeded the
development of unions, a result not intended by Congress. Thus, Congress included two provisions in the 1914 Clayton Act to reduce the
impact of the antitrust laws on the labor movement. 2 1 Section 6 of the
Clayton Act provides that labor unions are not combinations in restraint
of trade. 2 2 Section 20 restricts the injunctive power of courts in labor
disputes to certain enumerated types of union organizational
23
activities.
The Supreme Court interpreted section 20 narrowly and many
union activities were, after 1914, still subject to antitrust attack and the
15. Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc,
Powell v. NFL, No. 89-5091, (8th Cir. Jan. 17, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
16. Powell, 888 F.2d 559.
17. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635
(1985) (" 'The Sherman Act is designed to promote national interest in a competitive
economy ..
") (quoting American Safety Equip. Corp. v.J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d
821, 826 (2d Cir. 1968)); Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d. 520, 536 (7th Cir. 1986)
("[The] Court . . . has instead stressed that the antitrust laws seek to protect
competition.").
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ I, 2 (1988).
19. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797,
803-06 (1945).

20. R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 3 (1976).
21. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988);
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982)).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).
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injunctive power of the courts. 24 The Norris-LaGuardia Act, 2 5 enacted
in 1932, expanded the protection given to union activity by further restricting the use of injunctions in labor disputes. 2 6 Together, the relevant Clayton Act and Norris-LaGuardia Act provisions constitute the
statutory labor exemption. This exemption protects unions and certain
27
types of union activity from antitrust liability.
The statutory labor exemption does not immunize from antitrust
attack agreements between labor and management. 28 The courts, however, have recognized that the application of antitrust laws to labor-management agreements would undermine the collective bargaining process
mandated by Congress in the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"). 29 Thus, courts have created a common law non-statutory
30
exemption to immunize labor-management agreements.
The scope of this non-statutory labor exemption is not precisely defined. 3 1 The Supreme Court has not articulated a general standard for
applying the labor exemption to union-employer agreements. More
specifically, the Court has not addressed the issue of whether the labor
exemption immunizes provisions in an expired agreement.
Furthermore, the Court's prior decisions addressing the labor exemption do not provide any clear guidelines with which to resolve this
question within the context of professional sports. In rendering its earlier decisions, the Court faced and responded to the question of whether
the labor exemption would immunize certain union-proposed restraints.
In those cases, the union asserted the labor exemption to escape antitrust liability. The plaintiff was either the employer or a third party challenging a union-proposed restraint embodied in an unexpired
agreement. 3 2 In the current NFL dispute, as well as in each of the other
player restraint cases in which the application of the labor exemption
was at issue, the union is the plaintiff, and the NFL has raised the ex24. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 471-74 (1921) (secondary boycott not immunized from antitrust attack because defendant employees lacked
direct employment relationship with company which was ultimate object of boycott).

25. Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70, 71-73 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, and 113
(1982)).
26. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616,
621-22 (1975) (statutory enactments exempt specific union activities from operation of
antitrust laws).

27. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 501-03 (1940) (federal labor
policy codified in statutory exemption immunizes inherently anticompetitive collective ac-

tivities by employee).
28. See Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D.NJ. 1987) (citing United States
v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941)).
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
30. See, e.g., Connell, 421 U.S. at 621 (The nonstatutory exemption has as its source the
strong labor policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over
wages and working conditions.); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.Jewel
Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689 (1965) ("[The] [e]xemption for union-employer agreements is
very much a matter of accommodating the coverage of the Sherman Act to the policy of
the labor laws.").
31. SeeJ. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 525 (1979).
32. See Id. at 526 (citing Connell, 421 U.S. 616); United Mine Workers v. Pennington,
381 U.S. 657 (1965);Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676.
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33
emption to immunize its own proposed restraints.
This distinction is significant in light of the original purpose of the
labor exemption. Congress created the statutory labor exemption to
protect unions and their legitimate organizing activities from antitrust
attack.3 4 The purpose of the non-statutory labor exemption, which is
derived from the statutory exemption, is to effectuate Congress' limited
objective as expressed in the statutory exemption. 35 To protect the
union's role in collective bargaining, both parties to the agreement must
be protected from antitrust liability. As a result, the non-statutory exemption affords employers derivative protection from the antitrust
laws. 36 Nevertheless, the exemption is aptly denominated the "labor"
rather than "management" exemption.3 7 The original purpose of the
exemption - to benefit labor - endures and has undoubtedly influenced the Supreme Court's decisions.
The prior player restraint cases within the context of professional
sports are also of limited precedential value in the current dispute. In
each of the earlier cases the challenged restraints were unilaterally implemented prior to the formation of the players association. The restraints were initially incorporated in a collective bargaining agreement
while the union was in its infancy and too weak to resist management's
demands. The willingness of courts to recognize the union's infancy as
a factor in determining the scope of the labor exemption factually distinguishes the current dispute from the earliest player restraint cases.
More important, no previous court has addressed the legal effect of an
expired agreement. 3 8 In each of the earlier player restraint cases, of
course, the court addressed the same general policy choice raised in the
current dispute: whether federal labor policy encouraging collective
bargaining overrides the federal antitrust policy prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade. The focus of the current dispute, however, is
more specific: whether the federal labor policy encouraging collective
bargaining compels courts to exempt restraints contained in an expired
agreement. This specific policy choice was not addressed in the prior
39
cases.
33. See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801
(1977); Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 884-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (challenge by
NBPA), aff'd in part and revd in part sub nom. California State Council of Carpenters v.
Associated General Contractors 648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980), revd 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
34. See Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 700-13; Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec.
Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 801-08 (1945); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 229-37
(1941).
35. Connell, 421 U.S. at 622.
36. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 29, at 527.
37. Garvey, Foreword to The Scope of the Labor Exemption in ProfessionalSports: A Perspective
on Collective Bargaining in the NFL, 1989 DUKE L.J. 328, 337-38.
38. In Mackey, the only challenge to restraints in an expired agreement, the court
withheld the exemption because of the absence of bona fide, arm's-length negotiations.
543 F.2d at 615-16. The court specifically noted that its decision did not reach the question whether the exemption survived the expiration of the agreement. Id. at 616 n. 18.
39. Mackey, however, does offer some guidance. The Mackey court held that the labor
exemption immunizes player restraints provided those restraints are the product of bona
fide, arm's-length negotiations. See supra note 38. In other words, union approval seems
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IMPASSE TEST

In the current dispute between the NFLPA and NFL, the district
court held that the non-statutory labor exemption expired upon impasse. 4° The lower court reasoned that impasse "respects the labor law
obligation to bargain in good faith over mandatory bargaining subjects
following expiration of a collective bargaining agreement" and "promotes the collective bargaining relationship and enhances prospects
that the parties will reach a compromise on the issue." 4 ' At the same
time, the court reasoned that its impasse standard properly accommodated competing antitrust policies: "[b]y allowing a labor exemption to
survive only until impasse, the law will not insulate a practice from antitrust scrutiny, but will only delay enforcement of the substantive law until continued negotiations over the challenged provision become
pointless.

"42

The appellate court prefaces its rejection of the district court's impasse standard with a discussion of various issues that the court deems
germane to the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption. Among
those issues are the extent to which the framework of the NLRA precludes judicial intervention and application of the antitrust laws in labor
disputes, and the offsetting obligations, remedies, and weapons available under federal labor law to parties involved in a dispute over terms
and conditions of employment. 43 These issues, along with the underlying purpose of the labor exemption to accommodate competing labor
and antitrust policies, are discussed below.
A. JudicialIntervention in Labor Disputes
The Eighth Circuit correctly recognizes that "[tihe labor arena is
one with well established rules which are intended to foster negotiated
settlements rather than intervention by the courts."'44 Similarly, the
court correctly recognizes "that disputes over employment terms and
conditions are not the central focus of the Sherman Act." '4 5 Yet, the
court's recognition of these principles does not warrant its ultimate decision. These principles simply do not control the outcome of the current
dispute between the NFLPA and NFL.
When it enacted the federal labor statutes, Congress clearly intended to limit judicial involvement in labor disputes. The relevant provisions of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act preclude courts
46
from enjoining various types of concerted activity in labor disputes.
to be a prerequisite to the application of the exemption; the mere potential for bargaining
is not enough to immunize the restraints, and the exemption will not immunize restraints
unilaterally implemented by management.
40. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 788-89.
41. Id. at 789.
42. Id.
43. Powell, 888 F.2d 559.

44. Id. at 567.
45. Id. at 566.
46. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
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The purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to promote industrial peace through collective bargaining 4 7 and its procedural framework
compels parties involved in a collective bargaining relationship to make
an honest effort to resolve their differences at the bargaining table and
to seek redress for unfair labor practices from the National Labor Rela48
tions Board ("NLRB") rather than the courts.
Asking a court to enjoin protected concerted activity, redress an unfair labor practice or invalidate a collectively bargained term of employment contained in an unexpired agreement, however, is certainly
distinguishable from seeking a declaration of the parties' respective
rights under the antitrust laws regarding provisions in an expired collective bargaining agreement. The above legislation notwithstanding, no
authority exists to support an argument that a determination of the parties' rights under federal antitrust law is precluded in the current dispute. Judicial resolution of the underlying antitrust claim in the NFLPANFL dispute simply will not result in the type of judicial involvement in
the bargaining process with which Congress was concerned.
The purpose of limiting judicial intervention in labor disputes is to
preserve the parties' right to arrive at their own agreement. 49 Certainly,
judicial condemnation of the challenged restraints may benefit the union
at the bargaining table - it has the potential to shape the terms of the
agreement in the same manner that a declaration of the parties' respective rights under the labor laws or any other federal statute will shape
the agreement. As the court admits, however, the challenged restraints
involve mandatory subjects of bargaining. Thus, the parties have an obligation to bargain over the restraints, regardless of the outcome of the
current litigation. 50 Whether the court condemns the challenged restraints or instead concludes that they are immunized from antitrust attack, the parties will ultimately determine in what form, if any, the
restraints will continue to exist.
Much of the language cited by the Eighth Circuit to support the
proposition that the collective bargaining framework mandated by the
NLRA automatically precludes antitrust review suggests that the court
confuses the distinction between the statutory and non-statutory labor
exemption. The court cites Associated General Contractors of California v.
CaliforniaState Council of Carpenters,5 1 in which the Supreme Court noted
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982 and Supp. V 1987). Section 151 reads in pertinent
part: "It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining ......
48. See, e.g., Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 962 n.5 (2d. Cir. 1987) ("Any claim of unreasonable bargaining behavior must be pursued in an unfair labor practice proceeding
charging a refusal to bargain in good faith. . . . not in an action under the Sherman Act.")
(citation omitted).

49. See, e.g., Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 150 n.ll (1976); NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1960).
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1982).
51. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
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that Congress developed " 'a separate body of labor law specifically
designed to protect and encourage the organizational and representational activities of labor unions.' "52 The Powell court also cites Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local Union No. 576 v. Wellerau Foods, Inc., 5 3 a case in
which "employer agreements adopted in response to a strike caused
plaintiffs to be denied employment." ' 54 In that case, the Eighth Circuit
determined that the challenged employer conduct, the replacement of
striking workers, was lawful conduct under federal labor law and thus
could not constitute a violation of antitrust law: " 'the magnitude and
nature of any restraint of trade or commerce in this case directly follows
from the sanctioned conduct [and] [t]he agreement had no anticompetiFitive effect unrelated to the collective bargaining negotiations.'
nally, the Powell court cites Prepmore Apparel, Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America, 5 6 where the Fifth Circuit held that an employer's refusal to deal with a-union with respect to terms of employment was governed by the NLRA and not the Sherman Act.
In each of the above cited cases, reference is made to employer or
employee conduct. The types of conduct shielded from antitrust scrutiny in the above cases, however, have very little to do with the nonstatutory labor exemption. It is self-evident that union organizational
and representational activities, the replacement by an employer of striking workers, or an employer's refusal to deal with a union concerning
terms of employment are not vulnerable to antitrust attack. A union's
organizational activities fall within the scope of both the statutory labor
exemption and the NLRA. 5 7 Similarly, the replacement of striking
workers or an employer's refusal to bargain with a union is conduct gov"-55

58
erned by the NLRA and not the Sherman Act.

In essence, the court, by relying on the above types of conduct and
activities to conclude that the challenged restraints are immune from
antitrust attack, equates the right to form a union and engage in various
60
59
concerted activities, protected under the Clayton, Norris-LaGuardia
and National Labor Relations 6 1 Acts, with the mere potential to bargain
over mandatory subjects. This analysis suggests that the exemption
would apply by virtue of the union's existence from the moment of
union certification. Such an interpretation completely eliminates the
distinction that courts consistently have recognized between the statutory and non-statutory labor exemptions. It completely ignores the fact
52. Powell, 888 F.2d at 566 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 539-40).

53. 597 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1979).
54. Powell, 888 F.2d at 566 (citing Wetterau Foods, 597 F.2d 133).
55. Id. (quoting Wetterau Foods, 597 F.2d at 136).
56. Id. (citing Prepmore Apparel, 431 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 801 (1971)).
57, See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 62122 (1975) (statutory enactments exempt specific union activities from operation of anti-

trust laws); 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 104, 105, 113, and 159 (1982).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).

59. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).
60. 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, and 113 (1982).
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982 and Supp. V 1987).
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that the non-statutory labor exemption evolved after Congress enacted
the federal labor statutes because the courts recognized that those statutes authorized collective bargaining without immunizing restraints in
collective bargaining agreements. 6 2 In fact, absolute judicial refusal to
determine the parties' antitrust rights is inconsistent with the existence
of the labor exemption. Ifjudicial reluctance to shape the terms of an
agreement precludes courts from resolving antitrust disputes, the labor
exemption would be unnecessary. Courts would not have created the
non-statutory labor exemption to immunize provisions from antitrust attack if the policy of judicial non-intervention already accomplished the
same purpose.
B.

Remedies and Weapons Available under NLRA

In rejecting the district court's impasse test, the Eighth Circuit essentially concludes that the NFLPA-NFL dispute is a labor rather than
an antitrust dispute and, as such, should be resolved exclusively within
the framework of the National Labor Relations Act. 6 3 The court, in
reaching this conclusion, attaches great significance to the offsetting
legal and economic weapons available before and after impasse under
federal labor law through which the parties may seek resolution of their
dispute. 64 To allow an action under the Sherman Act would, according
the careful balance established
to the Eighth Circuit, "improperly upset
65
by Congress through the labor laws."
The court notes the comprehensive array of obligations, weapons,
and remedies which, upon expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, govern employer and employee conduct. 66 Both parties are obligated to bargain in good faith; 67 and, prior to impasse, management is
obligated to maintain the status quo concerning terms contained in an
expired agreement. 68 Upon impasse, management is permitted to make
unilateral changes reasonably comprehended within its pre-impasse
proposals. 6 9 At the same time, the union has a right to strike, 70 management has a right to lockout its employees, 71 and both parties have a
continuing right to petition the NLRB to seek a cease and desist order
prohibiting conduct constituting an unfair labor practice. 72 Thus, if
management exceeds its labor law rights in implementing employment
62. See Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 964 (D.N.J. 1987) (citing United States
v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941)).
63. Powell, 888 F.2d at 566-68:

64. Id. at 566-67.
65. Id. at 567.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 565 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d) (1982)).
68. Id. (citing Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v.Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 654 F.2d 625, 627 (9th Cir. 1981)).
69. Id. at 566-67 (ciiing Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 543 n.5 (1988)).
70. Id. (citing NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962)).
71. Id. at 567 (citing American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965)).
72. Id. (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938)).
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terms at impasse, the union must utilize NLRB procedures rather than
institute an action under the Sherman Act.
The court suggests that the weapons, remedies and procedures
sanctioned under the NLRA preclude antitrust scrutiny in the current
dispute. According to the court, application of the antitrust laws is a
weapon inconsistent with those weapons available under the NLRA as
well as the federal labor policy fostering collective bargaining. 73 Thus,
the court incorrectly implies that the weapons under the NLRA and the
antitrust laws are mutually exclusive. This analysis blurs the distinction
between federal labor policy and the policy underlying the labor
exemption.
The NLRA was designed to eliminate "obstructions to the free flow
of commerce . . .by encouraging the practice and procedure of collec-

tive bargaining."' 74 Accordingly, the general policy underlying the
weapons and remedies sanctioned by the NLRA and, in fact, all principles of federal labor law, is to promote collective bargaining. Two
widely accepted labor law principles cited by the Eighth Circuit in Powell
illustrate this point. For example, the prohibition against unilateral employer action fosters collective bargaining both by preserving mandatory
items for the bargaining table and by protecting the union's status as
exclusive bargaining representative. 75 Similarly, the specific purpose of
the status quo doctrine, which requires employers to continue in effect
provisions in an expired agreement, is to prevent management from undermining the union's bargaining authority. 76 The status quo doctrine
is thus a logical extension of the prohibition against unilateral action
regarding mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. Both principles
are designed to protect and preserve the bargaining process.
To the extent that the labor exemption immunizes restraints contained in a bona fide arm's-length agreement, the labor exemption also
fosters collective bargaining. Obviously, neither party would want to
bargain away any benefit in exchange for a provision that could subsequently be challenged on antitrust grounds. To suggest, however, that
this common purpose requires that the labor exemption continue beyond impasse for an indefinite period obscures the policy distinction between the exemption and other principles of federal labor law such as
the status quo doctrine and the prohibition against unilateral employer
action.
The foundational policy of the labor exemption, to reconcile antitrust and labor policies, 77 is clearly distinguishable from a policy
73. Id. at 566-68.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
75. See, e.g., NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962).
76. See, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960) (employer's unilateral change "tends to subvert the union's position as the representative of
the employees"); Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 391 F.2d 874, 877 (3d Cir. 1968) (emplover's unilateral action "would undermine the union's authority by disregarding its status as the representative of the employees").
denied, 434 U.S.
77. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.

801 (1977).
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designed to protect the status of the exclusive bargaining representative
or to preserve the bargaining process. Moreover, limiting the scope of
the labor exemption is simply not inconsistent with the status quo doctrine or any other labor law doctrine designed to foster collective
bargaining.
Enabling the union to enjoin unreasonable restraints after the
agreement expires and at a point when immunizing the restraint no
longer fosters collective bargaining does not interfere with federal labor
policy. The labor exemption logically immunizes restraints of trade only
as long as doing so fosters the bargaining process. An employer should
not be permitted to use policy arguments to shield illegal provisions that
the union no longer desires after a point in the negotiations when the
labor exemption no longer furthers these policies. At that point, an employer should be exposed to antitrust liability. If the union has indicated unambiguously that it no longer is interested in continuing the
challenged restraints, neither maintaining the status quo nor continuing
the labor exemption will foster collective bargaining or protect the
union's bargaining status.
The fact that the restraint was previously subject to good faith negotiations is relevant to an employer's obligation to maintain the status
quo; previous good-faith negotiations are not relevant to the application
or non-application of the labor exemption once the agreement has expired. At some point after the expiration of the agreement, an employer
should be forced either to comply with the antitrust laws or to negotiate
away benefits in return for the unreasonable restraint. The owners' argument that such a result creates an unjustifiable shift in bargaining leverage is difficult to accept. The union should have leverage to modify or
eliminate an illegal restraint it determines is no longer in its best
interest.

The court's conclusion that the exemption should continue beyond
impasse is particularly remarkable in light of the limits of one of the
doctrines the court relies on to justify its position. An employer's obligation to maintain the status quo does not continue indefinitely. The
status quo doctrine requires an employer only to continue prior conditions of employment until the parties reach impasse. 78 After bargaining
in good faith to impasse, an employer is free to implement unilateral
changes as long as those changes are consistent with the latest proposals
offered to the union prior to impasse. 79 Under the court's interpretation of the labor exemption, a union that has agreed to a restraint may
not challenge that restraint on antitrust grounds even after the parties
reach impasse and the employer is free to make unilateral change in employment conditions. Thus, an agreement to a particular unreasonablerestraint for a finite period operates to waive, indefinitely according to the
Eighth Circuit's decision, a party's rights under the antitrust laws. In
78. Bi-Rite Foods, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 59, 64-65 (1964).
79. Id. at 65.
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short, the players' rights under the antitrust laws lie, after the agreement
has expired, in the hands of the owners.
The Eighth Circuit's inability to distinguish the policy consideration
underlying the labor exemption from those policies underlying the
weapons of remedies available under the Act also led the court to confuse the labor exemption with impasse. Significantly, the court recognized impasse as a part of the bargaining process sanctioned by the
NLRA. The court, citing the Supreme Court in Charles D. Bonanno Linen
Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 8 0 characterized impasse as a "'temporary deadlock' " in negotiations broken in almost all cases through a change of
mind or the application of economic force. Moreover, the court viewed
impasse as a weapon " 'brought about intentionally by one or both parties as a device to further rather than destroy the bargaining
process.' "81

On the basis of this language, as well as the Supreme Court's conclusion that impasse was a recurring feature in the bargaining process
not sufficiently destructive of group bargaining to justify unilateral withdrawal, 8 2 the court somehow concludes that the district court's impasse
test treats impasse, a lawful stage of the collective bargaining process, as
misconduct and, as a result, conflicts with federal labor law. 8 3 In other
words, the court suggests that since impasse is a lawful stage of the bargaining process, exposure to antitrust liability upon impasse is inconsistent with the federal labor policy fostering collective bargaining. In
essence, the court perceives exposure to antitrust liability as a penalty
for impasse.
Impasse is a labor concept, rather than a concept intended to ac84
commodate the intersection of conflicting antitrust and labor policies.
Impasse means that the bargaining process, intended to be protected by
the exemption, has stopped. The significance of that occurrence is that
the employer is then permitted to unilaterally implement pre-impasse
proposals.8 5 At that point, it is impossible to conclude that the restraint
is the product of collective bargaining or that the restraint emerged
from the bargaining process. It is simply a unilateral rule imposed by
86
management.
To continue to immunize a restraint unilaterally imposed by management after impasse raises a serious question concerning not only the
purpose and scope of the labor exemption but also the objectives of
80. Powell, 888 F.2d at 564 (quoting Bonanno Linen Service, 454 U.S. 404 (1982)).
81. Id. (quoting Bonanno Linen Service, 454 U.S. at 412).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 566-68.
84. Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp. 960, 965-67 (D.N.J. 1987).
85. See Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete
Co., 484 U.S. 539, 544 n.5 (1988) (citing Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475, 478
(1967), aff'd sub nom. American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d

622 (1968)).
86. Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc,
Powell v. NFL, No. 89-5091, at 7 (8th Cir. Jan. 17, 1990), (Lay, C.J., dissenting) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Courts file).
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federal labor law. Was the labor exemption intended to protect the process or the results of collective bargaining? 8 7 Significantly, the federal
labor laws do not require the parties to reach an agreement.8 8 The Act
mandates the collective bargaining process; it does not mandate an
agreement between the parties. The labor exemption was intended to
protect this process.
Continuing the exemption beyond the point in time when the process is likely to produce an agreement over a particular restraint and
when permitting management to unilaterally implement the restraint is
to protect the substance or results of the bargaining process rather than
the process itself. This result redefines the labor exemption. The labor
exemption protects the process only if its application is contingent upon
consent or, in other words, if the restraint immunized emerges from the
process of collective bargaining. The results of that process are protected only to the extent necessary to protect the process itself. How
can the exemption be said to protect the process when its application
immunizes restraints rejected by the other party after the process has
stopped?
Ironically, the court itself cites Professor Weistart for the proposi-

tion that the NFLPA-NFL dispute ought to be resolved free of judicial
intervention " 'where the union has had sufficient impact in shaping the
content of the employer's offers' " and where the challenged restraint is
"'clothed with union approval.' "89 Yet, according to this language,
Weistart would appear to support a different conclusion than the Eighth
Circuit reached in Powell. If the bargaining process comes to a standstill,
can it be assumed that the union has had an impact shaping the content
of the restraint? Moreover, how can a restraint over which the parties
bargain to impasse and which is then unilaterally implemented by management be said to be clothed with union approval?
C.

Accommodation of Competing Labor and Antitrust Policies

Application of the labor exemption is not appropriate just because
its application is consistent with federal labor policy. The purpose of
the labor exemption is to accommodate conflicting policies under federal antitrust and labor laws. 90 To foster collective bargaining, the
courts have willingly subordinated antitrust policies and immunized
otherwise unlawful restraints which are the product of bona fide arm'slength negotiations. Thus, the parties are free to resolve their differ87. This question was raised by Professor Roger Noll. Stanford University, in a telephone interview with the author (Dec., 1989).
88. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) (Bargaining collectively creates an obligation to
meet and confer in good faith but "does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or
require the making of a concession.").
89. Powell, 888 F.2d at 567 (quotingJ. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS
590 (1979)).
90. See, e.g.,
Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 613-14 (8th Circuit 1976), cert.
denied, 434
U.S. 801 (1977) (availability of exemption "turns upon whether the relevant federal policy
is deserving of pre-eminence over Federal antitrust policy").
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ences over mandatory subjects through the bargaining process. Either
party may determine that agreeing to a restraint or bargaining away
rights under the antitrust laws, in return for certain benefits, is in its best
interest. As long as the restraint primarily affects the parties to the
agreement, their consent justifies immunization from the antitrust
9
laws. '

In situations where the parties agree to a particular restraint in the
course of good faith negotiations, the exemption is based on the parties'
consent and is intended to preserve the integrity of the bargaining process. A union clearly should not be permitted to invalidate undesirable
restraints contained in an unexpired agreement simply because it has
second thoughts concerning those restraints or makes a mistake injudgment during the negotiations. To permit a union to attack such restraints would undermine the federal labor policy favoring collective
bargaining by giving employers "no assurance that they could enter into
an agreement without exposing themselves to an action for treble damages." 92 In effect, this approach would completely subvert federal labor
law in favor of antitrust policies, a result clearly not intended by Con93
gress or the courts.
By the same token, however, management should not be permitted
to unilaterally impose unlawful restraints indefinitely or after the union
withdraws its consent simply because the union at one time agreed to
the restraint. This result would also undermine the bargaining process.
If this were the law, the union would be disinclined to accept any restrictions proposed by management.
In the current NFLPA-NFL dispute, the decision by the Eighth Circuit to continue to immunize the challenged restraints beyond impasse
neither advances federal antitrust and labor objectives nor accommodates competing antitrust and labor policies. Instead, continuing to immunize the challenged restraints further reduces competition in the
industry, a result inconsistent with federal antitrust laws, without promoting the policies of the NLRA. In fact, the court's decision to continue to immunize these restraints undermines the policies of the NLRA.
Absent the risk of antitrust liability, the owners have no incentive to bargain with the union over the restrictions on free agency. Because of the
lack of meaningful penalties under the NLRA, the NFL can avoid incurring costs by simply refusing to bargain over and continuing to impose
94
the current system on the players.
Within the context of the current NFL-NFLPA dispute, the proper
accommodation of federal antitrust and labor law requires that the labor
exemption expire certainly upon impasse if not simultaneously with the
collective bargaining agreement. -) 5 As Judge Lay points out in his dis91.
92.

Id. at 614.
Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954, 961 (2d Cir. 1987).

93. Id.
94. See Lock, Employer Unfair Labor Practices During the1982 NFL Strike: Help on the Way,
6 U. BRIDGEPORr L. REV. 189 (1985).
95. For a discussion of the justifications for the expiration of the exemption simulta-
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sent to the Eighth Circuit's denial for rehearing en banc, it is a complete
nonsequitor to hold that the restraints are entitled to protection after impasse "as an accommodation of good faith bargaining." 9 6 The bargaining process intended to be protected by the exemption ceased when the
parties reached impasse in negotiations over the restrictions on player
services. At that point, management was entitled under federal labor
law to unilaterally impose restrictions on free agency. In fact, that is
exactly what management did. The court erred, however, in concluding
that the restraints were, even after impasse, the product of collective
bargaining by virtue of the fact that the union agreed to them in a prior
agreement.
In this dispute, application of the antitrust laws after expiration of
the agreement and upon impasse will not undermine federal labor law.
The parties in this dispute were free to negotiate in good faith from the
conclusion of the 1986 season until sometime after February 1, 1988,
before potential free agents would accrue any damages under the antitrust laws. Thus, the parties had over a year to resolve this dispute
through the collective bargaining process without the risk of antitrust
liability. The parties were unable to reach an agreement during that
time frame - the collective bargaining process had reached a standstill.
As ofJanuary 1990, that standstill remains - absolutely no progress has
occurred in the negotiations between the parties over the restrictions on
player services. Perpetuating the exemption in this case completely negates the antitrust laws without fostering collective bargaining. Thus,
no justification exists for not furthering the purposes of the antitrust
laws.
V.

EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN CURRENT DISPUTE

The right of first refusal/compensation system contained in the
1982 NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement and described
above in the introduction virtually eliminated the movement of veteran
free agents in the NFL. Between 1977 and 1988, only two players
changed teams under that system. 9 7 Moreover, the system precluded
competitive bidding among teams for players and, as a result, suppressed player salaries far below open market levels. An employment
relationship of this nature, in which the employer retains perpetual
rights over employees, is unimaginable in almost every industry other
than professional sports and almost certainly violates federal antitrust
law.
The modified right of first refusal/compensation system unilaterally
implemented by management on February 1, 1989, permits each team
neously with the expiration of the agreement, see Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in

Professional Sports 1989 DUKE L.J. 339.
96. Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc,

Powell v. NFL, No. 89-5091, at 5 (8th Cir. Jan. 17, 1990) (Lay, C.J., dissenting) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Courts file).

97. See Afidavit of Richard A. Berthelsen, NFLPA General Counsel, at 13-14, Powell,
678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988) (No. 4-87-917).

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 67:2

to protect thirty-seven players.9 8 The new system, referred to by teams
and sports journalists as Plan B, subjects the thirty-seven "protected
players" on each team to a right of first refusal system similar to the one
contained in the 1982 agreement. Not surprisingly, not a single protected player changed teams under this system in 1989. 99
Under the new system, unprotected players become unrestricted
free agents, free to sign a contract with a new team without the compensation requirements applicable to protected players. 0 0° Two hundred
and twenty-nine unprotected players changed teams in 1989 under Plan
B.' 0 1 A large majority of these players, however, were either aging veterans with large contracts, players recovering from serious injuries, or
marginal players. 10 2 The top thirty-seven players on each team are still
subjected to a right of first refusal/compensation system similar to the
one contained in the 1982 agreement; and, accordingly, the NFLPA has
10 3
also challenged the new system.
The non-statutory labor exemption represents a judicial accommodation between competing congressional policies favoring collective
bargaining under the NLRA and free competition in business markets
under federal antitrust law. 10 4 Nonetheless, with the exception of its
discussion of the holdings in Mackey and Bridgeman v. NBA, the Eighth
Circuit in Powell largely ignores this well-established objective underlying the non-statutory labor exemption. ' 0 5 Instead, the court completely
subverts antitrust law on the premise that immunizing restraints beyond
impasse is somehow required under federal labor law.
The court cryptically states that its ruling does not entail that once a
union and management enter into collective bargaining, management is
forever exempt from the antitrust laws or that restraints on player services can never offend the Sherman Act.' 0 6 At another point in the opinion, the court states that its reading of the authorities leads it to
conclude that the NFL and players have not reached the point in negotiations where it would be appropriate to permit an action under the
Sherman Act.' 0 7 These statements by the court are remarkable in light
of what has transpired since the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement
expired on August 31, 1987.
Since that date the players have adamantly refused to agree to the
98. See Scorecard. SPORTS
99. King, Inside the NFL,

100.
101.
102.
(46%)

ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 13, 1989, at
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 18,

7.
1989, at 68.

Id. See also Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 779-81.
See King, supra note 99, at 68.
See generally id., ("Of the 229 players who switched clubs under the system 105
made opening day rosters. Of these, 33% (14% of the total) started in Week I

103. Id. (" 'It wasn't lawful and wasn't adequate for all players in 1989, and it won't be
lawful or adequate in 1990.' says Doug Allen, the union's assistant executive director.")
104. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 613-14 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
801 (1977) (availability of exemption "turns upon whether the relevant federal policy is
deserving of pre-eminence over federal antitrust policy").
105. Powell, 888 F.2d 559.
106, Id. at 568.
107. Id. at 566.
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continuation of the NFL's restrictions on free agency. Meanwhile, the
players struck and management staged replacement games during the
1987 regular season, both parties have filed unfair labor practice
charges with the NLRB, 10 8 the current antitrust dispute has been
delayed by motions and interlocutory appeals and continues to linger in
the courts while a new action is being contemplated and the NFLPA has
allegedly renounced its union status to enable the players to avoid the
Eighth Circuit's decision. I0 9 Finally, no meaningful negotiations concerning the restrictions on free agency have taken place since the strike
ended in the fall of 1987 and management has since withdrawn from
and terminated both contributions to the NFL pension and the accruals
of severance pay for the 1989 season and thereafter. I 10 Presumably,
these benefits were part of the quid pro quo for the NFL's restrictions on
free agency contained in the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement. If,
as the Eighth Circuit states, its decision does not absolutely preclude
antitrust review, it is difficult to imagine what else must transpire to trigger application of the antitrust laws. As Judge Lay rhetorically asks in
his dissent from the court's denial of hearing en banc: "If the exemption
does not end at impasse, when does it end?"'II Rather than accommodating labor and antitrust policies, the court's decision gives an employer everlasting immunity from the antitrust laws.
Expiration of the labor exemption does not mean that management's restrictions on free agency necessarily have to violate federal antitrust law. The Sherman Act condemns only unreasonable restraints of
trade.'' 2 In the absence of an agreement, management is always free
upon impasse to unilaterally implement reasonable restrictions on free
agency. Presumably, management implemented Plan B with the intention of positioning itself to argue that its restrictions were reasonable in
the event of an adverse decision from the Eighth Circuit. It is unlikely
that a court would conclude that Plan B is a reasonable restraint of
trade. That is not to say, however, that the NFL could not implement a
more enlightened free agency system that would survive antitrust
scrutiny.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the absence of an antitrust exemption, the NFL's current system
of free agency almost certainly violates federal antitrust law. During the
108. See NLRB Case No. 2-CB-12117 (NFLMC charge); NLRB Case Nos. 5-CA-19170,

19508 (NFLPA charges).
109. See Startling Move to Decertify Leaves NFL Union in 'Uncharted Area,' Wash. Post, Nov.
9, 1989, at CIO, col. 1 (NFLPA to "seek decertification as the legal bargaining representative for NFL players in an effort to strip the league of ... antitrust immunity").
110. The NFL withdrew from the pension on March 31, 1989. Telephone interview
with John Macik, NFL staff representative, (Jan. 29, 1990).
1i1. Order Denying Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc,
Powell v. NFL, No. 89-5091, at 6 (8th Cir. Jan. 17, 1990) (Lay, CJ., dissenting) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Courts file).

112. See, e.g., Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918);
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56-66 (1911).
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life of the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement and, according to the
district court in Powell, until the parties reached impasse, 113 that system
was exempt from antitrust attack by virtue of the non-statutory labor
exemption. The non-statutory labor exemption is based on union
consent.
The current NFLPA-NFL dispute involves an employment system
that the union has unequivocally rejected for more than two years. It is
absolutely inconceivable that a court could conclude that the NFL's current system is somehow the product of collective bargaining or union
consent, and thereby qualifies for the protection of the non-statutory
labor exemption when in fact the system has been unceremoniously
rammed down the union's throat by management. Yet, this is exactly
what the Eighth Circuit has concluded.
Although the court insists that its decision does not preclude antitrust review, the court gives no indication of what might trigger application of the antitrust laws." 4 The union is thus left with the option of
decertification in order to invoke the protection of the antitrust laws. As
Judge Lay says, "the union should not be compelled, short of self-destruction, to accept illegal restraints it deems undesirable."' 15 The
Eighth Circuit could not possibly argue that the appropriate accommodation of federal labor and antitrust policy requires a union to decertify
in order to invoke, on behalf of its members, rights under the antitrust
laws.

113. Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 788-89.
114. Powell, 888 F.2d at 568.
115. Order Denying Petitioh for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc,
Powell v. NFL, No. 89-5091, at 8 (8th Cir. Jan. 17, 1990) (Lay, CJ., dissenting) (LEXIS
Genfed library, Courts file).

